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Current Developments in China & Tibet: Implications for India

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Member, National Security Advisory Board

Former Additional Secretary, R&AW



परममयुता प्रज्ञा राष्ट्रभयुदयसाधिका
Wisdom with valour brings glory to the nation

Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation



Jayadeva Ranade

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Former Additional Secretary, R&AW*

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Current Developments in China & Tibet Implications for India

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Current Developments in China & Tibet: Implications for India*

I think it is a very timely topic considering that so many changes have taken place in China that we need to take note of. Since the topic is 'Current Developments in China & Tibet and implications for India', I will try to give an overview of the changes that have taken place in China and I will build into the narrative the implications for us and wind up with Tibet - the developments there and how that will impact on us. In the process I will try and hint at the vulnerabilities that exist in China and which could, of course if properly viewed, offer opportunities.

At the outset let me say that the new leadership that was installed in China at the 18th Party Congress, which was an important Congress, last November (2012) saw a very smooth transition of power. When I say smooth transition there is, I think, enough evidence to point to the fact that Xi Jinping, who is now the supreme leader in China combining the post of President of China, the General Secretary of the Party and the Chairman of the Military Commission¹, worked in very close coordination with Hu Jintao, his predecessor, for at least two years or more. And I say that because the indicators are visible. Let me name a few. One, he was very quick off the mark after taking over, exhibiting a pronounced



Xi Jinping



Hu Jintao

self-confidence and began assembling a brains trust of his own. He moved much faster than his predecessors. Secondly, he appointed, or rather the Party Secretary of Beijing was appointed months before the 18th Party Congress took place, in other words, before Xi Jinping assumed full power. The post of Party Secretary of Beijing is normally held by a confidant of the Chief of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Particularly, the man who was chosen was in fact close to retirement and was a Central Committee member, which was unusual. Of course he did get his promotion and is still in the saddle.

Another point was the appointment by Xi Jinping of the Head of his General Office in the Military Commission, which is a key slot, considering that he is the only other civilian in the Military Commission. Chen Shiju, whom he appointed as Head of the General Office had also been Hu Jintao's secretary for over 25 years and was in charge of Hu's personal office. That does show a certain closeness between the two and a certain sense of self-confidence.



Chen Shiju

There are some other indicators, particularly in the military field where we find that the heads of the major departments in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), as well as the Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission were appointed

* Keynote address at the Roundtable on Current Developments in China & Tibet: Implications for India, organized by Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation at the India International Centre, New Delhi on 3rd October, 2013.

¹ The Central Military Commission (CMC) commands and controls the powerful Peoples Liberation Army (PLA).



18th Party Congress

and announced before the 18th Party Congress. This is very unusual indeed because they are supposed to be under control of the 18th Party Congress. The 18th Congress was unusual in many respects and certain things were quite noticeable. Firstly, it was to select a new generation of leaders, who for the first time had not been selected or chosen or identified by the veteran cadres or former Long Marchers². In

fact Hu represented the last of those people. So Xi Jinping, to that extent, was new in the field. Secondly, in the run up to the 18th Party Congress, we saw a new kind of politics in China, which many of us, who have been watching the scene for quite a number of years, haven't seen. We saw, I would say, almost a western style of campaigning going on there; of course with their own differences, shall I say with Chinese characteristics, where, people who were Party Secretaries or people who were contenders for posts in the Politbureau or in the Politbureau Standing Committee began openly taking positions on certain issues in order to attract the attention of their elders. This was something new!

And we also noticed for the first time, the usually reclusive and low key, but very powerful, children of old veteran cadres called the 'princelings' - I would prefer the term 'Red Descendents', because not all of them were children of very high ranking cadres - coming out and taking positions on public issues. They took positions on key issues at public gatherings in Beijing and for the first time we saw an assembly of such people and they raised what the Chinese call 'life and death' issues for the Party. They spoke about the extent of corruption that had weakened the Party, they spoke about the laxity in Party discipline and, in fact, some of them wondered where the Party was headed, whether it would continue to remain the ruling Party and some pointed to the manner in which the disease of ostentation and lavish lifestyles had spread throughout the Party. In fact one of them pointed out that the amount of money spent on banquets and purchase of luxury limousines by Party cadres exceeded even the national defence budget in a particular year. So, these were strong comments made by them and they included people like the son of



The-Long-March

² Those who participated in Mao's Long March which was a tactical retreat strategy undertaken between 1933-1935 to escape the Chiang-Kai-Shek KMT's encirclement of the Communist forces.

the former Party propaganda chief, the son of the former President of China, and Xi Jinping's - the present chiefs - eldest sister! So it was the fairly strong comments by these people which, of course, were noted.

In this backdrop there were two other things that happened. One, there was a spread of pro-Mao sentiment, or what some call 'Mao nostalgia'. It happens here too. I am sure, many of you have come across people who say that in the British days, things were good; rice was so much cheaper, etc. They forget of course the bad things. That is what is happening in China. From a classless society at the time this transition began, they began seeing people who were rich and not so rich and some very poor. This kind of sentiment does then spread and that is what began happening, and is happening, in China. There was of course in-tolerance - an inbuilt tolerance -- that continues to this day for the 'left-wing' or 'ultra-Left' websites. These continued to post their views. But as I mentioned earlier, there was a new kind of campaigning and some of these people, some of the aspirants, began tapping into these sentiments.

The foremost among them was Bo Xilai³ and you have all heard about the Bo Xilai incident and the manner in which he has now been sentenced. But earlier he tapped this sentiment and began building up his popular power base in order to see that he makes it to the Politbureau Standing Committee thereby becoming one of the seven great men who



Wang Lijun Bo Xilai's,
Police Chief

rule China. He failed in his attempt because he was perceived as a challenge to the Party Centre. But in the process what happened was that he gave a severe jolt to the CCP leadership, which realized that they had been very lax in matters of inner party discipline and that even the Party 'nomenklatura', who were high ranking elements among the party cadres had begun hobnobbing with foreigners and begun being suborned by foreign intelligence organizations as was Bo Xilai's chief of police⁴ who tried to seek asylum in the US Consulate in Chengdu. So there was a crackdown, this also led to, and here Tibet does come in, a suspicion all around in the CCP -- a suspicion about minorities, doubts about their loyalties. We saw this reflected in the fact that there was not a single Tibetan in the PLA delegation that was selected for the 18th Party Congress and the Tibetan representation in the Central Committee was reduced to one person.

³ Senior CCP leader, former Commerce Minister, Member of Central Politbureau, Mayor of Dalian city, Governor of Liaoning province in northeastern China and former Secretary of the CCP's Chongqing branch. Bo aspired to enter the powerful Politbureau Standing Committee at the 18th Party Congress. As Chongqing Party Secretary Bo revived the Mao style campaign to "revive red culture" and improve public morale. Bo was expelled from the Party on charges of breaking Party discipline and corruption and after his wife was charged with murdering a British businessman. In September 2013, Bo was sentenced to life imprisonment and stripped of all his assets.

⁴ Wang Lijun was the Vice-Mayor of Chongqing and Head of the Public Security Bureau. In February 2012 Lijun travelled to U.S. Consulate in Chengdu and was closeted there for hours before leaving on his own. It was believed that Lijun had gone seek asylum and had evidence regarding corruption at the top levels of the CCP.

The reaction to all these developments was that the Party closed ranks and decided that they would opt for loyal, doctrinaire cadres who would stick to Party discipline and adhere to the Party line. In other words, the chance of reformers getting ahead was brought to naught and they picked up these, what I



Yu Zhengsheng



Zhang Gaoli



Wang Qishan

would call stolid, tough characters into the Politbureau Standing Committee. Let me mention a few of them. First, because that would have an impact on Chinese policy, we have Yu Zhengsheng, who is the head of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which is also the body that interacts and oversees minority-related issues as well as non-Communist Party issues. Zhang Gaoli is the executive Vice-Premier, a hardliner who believes in big business, in other words, he is going to favour state-owned enterprises and probably try and go slow on the reforms. Wang Qishan, who is known as a stern administrator, has been brought in to head the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, in other words, to help Xi Jinping in his crackdown on corruption. They also retained Liu Yunshan who was the Party Propaganda Chief, a hardliner and he continues to look after the propaganda apparatus even after his elevation into the Politbureau Standing Committee.

As if to push the point that Party discipline is of extreme importance and that the Party ideological line is of extreme importance, Xi Jinping has been referring to Mao's doctrine and quoting from Mao ever since he took over. Over the last month we have also seen that a new programme, or a new 'mass-line' campaign, has started in China and gradually all provinces, all state owned enterprises and all major departments and units have initiated the campaign and come out saying that the Party Centre's directives must be obeyed and that all Party cadres must speak with a unified voice and there should be no differences in opinions.

So that kind of campaign has started and again, for those of us who have been looking at things for many years, Xi Jinping has also initiated 'criticism and self-criticism' sessions in all the provinces where the Party Secretaries, Governors and all cadres participate, and Xi Jinping has asked them to be even more candid or frank in their criticism and self-criticism and not just be formalistic. There is of course speculation among certain analysts as to whether this is a prelude to the old 'Hundred Flowers' campaign!

So, what are the characteristics of the new leaders? I think that is most important for us because that is what moulds the minds of the people. There are a couple of things I would like to mention here: first, the entire top leadership of the CCP today are, and particularly the Politbureau Standing Committee, people who have grown up during the Cultural Revolution years, that means they have grown up in difficult times, they have joined the Party during the Cultural Revolution period so they have been through the real 'Red phase'.

Many of them have suffered personally or seen their family members suffer, torture, die, and yet they joined the Party. That indicates a certain toughness, a moulding of the mind in adversity. They also have a strong sense that it is up to them to bring China back, or restore China, to its former glory and status in the world. This view is enunciated in Xi Jinping's 'China's Dream'.⁵ It is not a dream like we talk about an American dream or an Indian dream where you have a house and you have food and you have a car. No, it's a muscular dream and that is something we need to take note off.

Xi talks of wiping out past humiliations, in other words, the old treaties etc. because they were 'unequal treaties'. He talks about putting wealth into the people's pockets, very understandable, and laudable I would say, and he talks about a strong, rejuvenated China, a strong nation. It's a very muscular kind of assertive dream that he has put forward and which is fast becoming a kind of guiding principle for China. And the fact that it is being endorsed by the Party is evident from the manner in which within a month of the 18th Party Congress very senior Party cadres fanned out across the globe and went to important capitals, they came to Delhi too. They went to London; they went to Washington to explain the 'Chinese Dream' and this is the explanation that they offered - which I just mentioned. This has a direct co-relation to this leadership's view on borders, on sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are seeing it in play in the South China Sea; we are seeing it in the manner in which they are dealing with Japan, in the manner in which they are dealing with Philippines and Vietnam and how those three countries are dealing with China.

But what emerges here, is the assertiveness that China has displayed and the fact that it is adamant on securing its sovereignty over these waters [South China Sea]. It is trying to avoid military confrontation as far as possible but is not backing off from pushing these countries very hard. As far as we [India] are concerned we have just witnessed it too. In two incidents which stand up among the many that have happened over the last year or two, there is the Depsang plains incident⁶ and then in Arunachal Pradesh.⁷ In both these cases the incursions came to public notice -- they dominated our electronic and our print

⁵ Xi made reference to the Chinese Dream in November 2012 and since then it has been picked up promoted extensively by the Chinese media, intellectuals, think-tanks and the academia. In his first address to the nation on 17th March 2013 Xi discussing the dream had said: "strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation... To realise the Chinese road, we must spread the Chinese spirit, which combines the spirit of the nation with patriotism as the core and the spirit of the time with reform and innovation as the core." Developing military and a strong nation are essential components of that dream.

⁶ Incursions by Chinese PLA forces in Depsang in Ladakh in April 2013. The PLA forces had entered about 19 kilometres on the Indian side of the LAC.

⁷ Incursion in Chaglagam area of Arunachal Pradesh in August 2013. According to reports the patterns of Chinese incursions have seen some change of late: "Apart from frequent patrol drills inside Indian territory, agencies have observed that Chinese troops are also clearing forest cover in Arunachal Pradesh and taking away timber and other forest produce. Sources said this was a new development as earlier, Chinese troops merely engaged in muscle flexing through intrusions, patrols or short stays on the Indian side.

"It has been observed in the recent past that in Arunachal Pradesh, several forest areas along the border have been cleared by Chinese troops. They have carried away timber and other forest produce. There is also evidence of make-

media and the Chinese who obviously were getting daily reports were not sensitive to Indian public opinion on these issues. They did not withdraw, they were very tough on negotiations and they were insensitive to the embarrassment to the Indian Government. What came through again was that when it comes to questions of territorial integrity and sovereignty these issues are irrelevant.

The Chinese made that very clear last August (2012) when through the Chinese official news agency 'Xinhua', they declared on August 27th that burgeoning economic ties - and this was addressed to the Philippines and Japan just before Benigno Aquino's [President of Philippines] visit to Beijing - do not translate into good bilateral relations.

Here too, in the Depsang incident if you recall, though their Premier Li Keqiang was supposed to come here [New Delhi], they did not resile or back off from the Depsang incident. They went ahead and at that time what one heard being put out by officials of the Chinese Embassy was that it was assessed that the visit would not be scrubbed by us.⁸

In conclusion let me just touch on Tibet, because that is also a part of the topic. Again here the developments have a direct impact on us. And I will just refer to two or three small things. One is the manner in which the 2008 developments have begun unfolding in Tibet⁹ and I think they have gained a fresh momentum. I will not go into details but the [5th] Tibet Work Forum of 2010¹⁰ gave fillip to the developmental activities inside Tibet. A lot more projects were sanctioned, lots of money was pumped in and also bonuses were given around the same time to PLA troops to get them to serve in Tibet. But as far as the defence or strategic infrastructure is concerned they have completed eight airfields, all

shift timber cutting units in the area," said an officer from the security establishment. (Source: "Changing Patterns of Chinese incursions in Arunachal Pradesh cause ripples of worry in security establishment" accessed at: <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/china-incursions-new-patterns-arunachal-indian-army-worried/1/301439.html>, (India Today, August 26th, 2013)

⁸ Li visited India between 19th -22nd May 2013.

⁹ Series of protest movements by monks against China that spread all over Tibet in March 2008. The protests also marked the anniversary of an anti-Chinese uprising in 1959.

¹⁰ "During the 5th Tibet Work Forum in January 2010 [convened at Beijing between January 18-20, 2010] (Tibet Work Forums are large meetings called every 5 or 10 years to discuss the CCP's Tibet policies. They are attended by all members of the powerful Politbureau's Standing Committee, senior PLA generals, United Front Work Department officials, regional leaders, etc.), it was apparently decided to send 21,000 Han and Tibetan Party officials in teams of four to each of the TAR's 5,453 administrative villages; they had to remain there for a period of 4 years. Each team member could rotate to a new location after 12 months only; they were assigned to a particular village for at least 25 days in a month. Their objectives were five-fold:

1. To strengthen the Party organization at the local level.
2. To promote stability by persuading villagers to join the struggle against the Dalai Lama's splittist activities and independence plans.
3. To improve the economy of each village and create new jobs for the village youth,
4. To educate the locals to appreciate and be grateful to the motherland and the Party
5. To get each village to begin to more effectively carry out the plans and policies of the Party"

Source: (Claude Arpi, The Cause of Resentment, accessed at: <http://claudearpi.blogspot.in/2012/03/cause-of-resentment.html> (October 1st, 2013)

very modern and equipped with the latest facilities, inside Tibet. The Civil Aviation Administration of China also announced plans for 59 airfields in and around Tibet, so just think of the consequences. Border posts and border roads have been completed along the entire border, I say this with special reference to the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA)¹¹ and the potential pitfalls that it has. Each one of their border posts is linked by road and linked by fibre optic communications with each other and with their rear Headquarters. They are also backed by modern airfields and barracks and ammunition and food storage dumps have also been built anticipating the induction of additional troops in these areas. So provisions have been made for all that.

Then we come to the railway line that has been built from Qinghai to Lhasa. It is a tremendous feat which they have done and they are now working on extending it to Shigatse, and then, they have virtually given a commitment to the Nepalese that they will build it from Shigatse to Kathmandu. Recently, I have also heard, I don't know how far it will get confirmed, that there is talk of bringing this railway line to Lumbini [Nepal]. And if that comes, I think for us, it is cause for very serious worry. We have an Army Chief with us here [General V.N.Sharma¹² who attended the deliberations] and I think he will bear me out that in Nepal they do not have the manpower or skills to build a railway. It will be built by Chinese labour, which will really speaking mean by PLA personnel, who will build the

... Speaking at the forum, then President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao [had] laid out goals that would strengthen further policy initiatives that already had substantial impact on the Tibetan people and culture: "accelerating economic development, increasing household income (especially in rural areas), improving social services, and protecting "stability" by striking" at what [the Chinese term] separatist threat from the "the Dalai clique."

"The Fifth Forum introduced a new and important initiative: establishing the coordinated implementation of Party and government policies on Tibetan issues in an area that will include not just the Tibet Autonomous Region, but also Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties located in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. The expanded area is contiguous and approximately doubles the number of Tibetans who live within the forum policy area. Fifth Forum objectives have incorporated measures and trends that took shape after the 2001 Fourth Forum on Tibet Work: using newly created government regulations to intrude upon and control Tibetan Buddhism, and expanding the campaign to end the Dalai Lama's influence among Tibetans. The Fifth Forum committed the Party and government leadership to achieving sweeping economic, social, and cultural changes throughout the Tibetan autonomous areas of China by 2020—the same year that the government intends to have completed the "redesign" of Lhasa and the construction of a network of railways crisscrossing the Tibetan plateau." [Source: "Communist Party Leadership Outlines 2010-2020 "Tibet Work" Priorities at the "Fifth Forum", March 9, 2010, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, accessed at: <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/communist-party-leadership-outlines-2010-2020-tibet-work-priorities> (October 6th, 2013).

¹¹ Signed in Beijing between the two Prime Ministers on 23rd October, 2013. Despite the signing of the BDCA, in December 2013, PLA troops abducted five Indians in Chumar sector of Ladakh from well within the Indian Territory. "The five were handed back to the Indian side by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops after the Indian Army authorities sought a flag meeting on the matter and warned that the issue would be raised at a higher level. The Indians along with their cattle were apprehended by the PLA last week and were taken to their camp across the LAC in a bid to stake their claim on the area. The Army Headquarters also said that the detained Indians were not Army porters but civilians." (The Pioneer, "PLA Kidnaps Five Indians to Stake Claim on Ladakh", 16th December, 2013.)

¹² General V.N.Sharma, PVSM, AVSM served as Chief of Army Staff between 1988-1990.

railway and who will of course operate it.

Similarly there is a huge shortage of water in northern China and the latest reports you would have all read is about the shortage of rice and that China has been importing large amounts of rice. They are also anticipating a decline in food production by 2045 in which case the incentive to divert the rivers from the south to the north will increase and I think the dams that we are seeing being constructed are already a sign of that.

But what is happening in Tibet itself? They have a got a new Tibet Party Secretary appointed at the behest of Xi Jinping, so again that is an indication that he had started exercising authority even before taking over and this gentleman has brought a new style of operation. On the one hand he is promoting economic development, which is his forte, he is bringing more business in and he is sanctioning more projects and developing the infrastructure in Lhasa and the bigger cities of the Tibet Autonomous Region. On the other, he is increasing Party surveillance across Tibet, so all villages - there are over 590 odd villages in Tibet - now have a Party representative which they didn't have earlier. All monasteries have a party organization in them and, in fact, they have even gone to the extent of creating a bureaucratic structure whereby monks who are loyal and reliable are given pensions, given a salary and are given a promotion. They have set up a grid system which has over 690 police stations ensuring that, and I am quoting the Tibet Party Secretary, the response to any incident is given within three to five minutes. That is the kind of coverage that they have managed to secure. But in the midst of all this we have a lot of frustration in Tibet. The number of self-immolations have reached 122 or so, and they are continuing.¹³

The Tibetans continue to venerate the Dalai Lama. The self-immolations signify one very important factor, which is that the protests -- the epicenter of protests -- has shifted inside China and inside Tibet. It is no longer a movement or aspiration that is led from outside Tibet. And that means that there are 6 million Tibetans in China who at any time could get, you can say either 'infected' or 'inspired' depending on how you look at it, but the Chinese leadership is very worried. And here I must mention, because I did talk about the bonuses etc. given to PLA troops, I must mention a document that came out recently, which was written by the Peoples' Armed Police Political (PAPP) Department in October 2008. I did refer to 2008 being a critical year -- that was the year of the riots and this document mentioned that the PLA and the People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) troops deployed in the Tibetan plateau, which includes not only the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) but also Sichuan and Qinghai, are suffering severe psychological stress and problems because they are in a state of fearing constant attack, and they are in a state where they are unable to reconcile to shooting and killing people. Since then the hospitals and medical institutes in China have begun sending delegations of psychologists to all

¹³ As per figures released by the Tibet Media Bureau at the Office of H.H. Dalai Lama the number of self-immolations till December 2013 have been 124 (105 Male & 19 Female) and the number of the Tibetans who succumbed is 107. (Source: <http://tibet.net/factsheet-immolation-2011-2012/>)

these areas to treat the personnel. This could have been one of the factors that prompted the thinking in the Chinese leadership to take a new initiative on Tibet.

And here I conclude by saying that for the Chinese leadership, Tibet has come to the top of their agenda. It is a domestic agenda, but it is also domestic plus international and they are addressing it. We are seeing two or three things that have happened recently. One is a visit by a person called Xiao Wunan,¹⁴ he is a United Front Works Department provincial director-level person, who came to Dharamsala very quietly and met all the leading lights in one day and went back. He has been trying to impress upon people that he has connections to Xi Jinping and that some fresh initiatives are in the offing on the Tibet issue. Of course, the soft sell is that this will appeal to the Tibetan people. But on the ground, as I just spelt out to you, things have not changed. The controls are extremely tight and they will continue to be tightened.



Xiao Wunan

The second thing is that some comments were made by a senior member of the Central Party School faculty, Jin Wei [of the Social Science Teaching & Research Section of the Central Communist Party School]. She gave a very surprising interview to a magazine based in Hong Kong [Asia Weekly]. The editor of the magazine and the person who took her interview is an accomplice, a friend of Xiao Wunan, who visited Dharamsala and met all three top leaders. Jin Wei gave an interview where she said that the Chinese would like to resume talks with the Dalai Lama; they would like to invite the Dalai Lama, either to Macao or Hong Kong or even to Beijing if it is confirmed that he has given up political activity. But the central point in her lengthy interview is that under any circumstances they do not want a situation of 'two Dalai Lamas' like they have of 'two Panchen Lamas'. So they have said that 'we want at all costs to have a reincarnation inside China'. So that is the final point. There has, of course, been a reaction and Zhu Weiqun, who was a hardline Vice Minister of the United Front Work Department, has said that there is no question of relaxation. The Chairman of the CPPCC repeated that. Let me also end by saying that, in the context of our borders, all the senior Chinese central leaders who visit Tibet go to Nyingchi which, according to Chinese maps, includes Arunachal Pradesh.



Jin Wei



Zhu Weiqun

¹⁴ Xiao Wunan is also the Executive Vice Chairman, Asia Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation (APECF) of which the Nepal Maoist leader Pushp Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) is a senior functionary. APECF was the organization which proposed to fund the Lumbini development project that would see China develop the spot into religious-tourist hub in Nepal.

Some Answers

Q: Who after the Dalai Lama?

A: I am afraid I am not in a position to answer that. The Dalai Lama hasn't made it clear but what he has said is that his reincarnation will not be found inside China. He has also said that there may not be a 'reincarnation' but there may be an 'emanation'. But that is one part. As far as the Chinese are concerned, they have started setting in place legislation and procedures where communist cadres are going to select a religious leader. So in 2007 you saw a legislation being enacted as I had referred to in my talk to Jin Wei's interview, where she has stressed on the fact that China just cannot afford to have two Dalai Lamas like it has two Panchen Lamas, so the stage is being set for that eventuality when it occurs.



Dalai Lama

Q: About our not being a small country, our being very strong and why not getting water treaties done etc?

A: Let me just refer to the comments made by our two honourable Members of Parliament past and present¹⁵ about 'peace being more desirable than war'. I think everyone believes that, but let me just say that it takes two to tango. I think if we talk, and India has not been lacking in that, at times we talk too much peace, we have to realize what China is doing. They are acquiring territory through a policy of deterrence via dominance. Basically when they intrude into an area, what happens is they come, they stay there for a while, they go back, then they keep coming, the frequency increases and our side stops going and the territory willy nilly becomes Chinese territory. That is what is happening. It has happened in Ladakh, it has happened in Arunachal, I have also walked the border and seen that is what is happening.

As far as the army being strong and mighty etc., I agree with you. We are no more like in 1962, but that should not lead to a sense of complacency. The fact is that the Chinese troops come right up to the border whereas it takes us days and weeks to go up to the border. That is the first point.

Second, you talked of asymmetry. Certainly we also talk of asymmetry, but we are yet slightly away from it. Hopefully we'll catch up in a short while but that is the drawback

¹⁵ Shri Tapir Gao, former Member of Parliament & General Secretary, BJP & Shri Janardhana Swamy, Member of Parliament (Lok Sabha), Member, Standing Committee on External Affairs.

that we have. But I will invite your reference to an article written by the Chinese and that too in the 'People's Daily', which is the official mouthpiece of the Party, where they have said that what our country [India] needs is not guns or more soldiers but what it needs is mental toughness. They were talking about us, they referred to India and said this was a message for you. All I am trying to say is that there has to be a marriage of political will and military muscle to tackle them.

Finally I agree with you about trying to promote religious contact and trying to promote educational contact. I think it takes two to tango and the Chinese have not been willing, they have not even been willing to facilitate the pilgrimage to Kailas Manasarovar. So let me end with a comment I had made earlier about the BDCA, I only hope that it is not an agreement which sets us back many years.

Taking the reins

The likely structure of the Central Military Commission after the 18th party congress late next year

Chairman Xi Jinping



Vice-chairmen



Chang Wanquan



Xu Qiliang



Wu Shengli

Members

Defence Minister



Zhang Qinsheng

Chief of General Staff



Fang Fenghui

OR



Zhang Youxia

Director of General Political Department



Liu Yuan

OR



Zhang Haiyang

Director of General Logistics Department



Hou Shusen

Commander of Second Artillery Force



Wei Fenghe

Navy Commander



Sun Jianguo

Air Force Commander



Ma Xiaotian

Director of General Armament Department



Zhang Youxia

OR



Xu Fenlin

Potential new commanders of China's seven military regions



Shenyang Jia Xiaowei



Beijing Wang Ning



Lanzhou Liu Yuejun



Jinan Zhao Zongqi



Nanjing Qin Weijiang



Guangzhou Qi Jianguo




Chengdu Hou Jizhen

SCMP

Glimpses of the Programme



Shri Jayadeva Ranade addressing the gathering.



National General Secretary of BJP, Shri Tapir Gao (left) welcoming Shri Jayadev Ranade by presenting him a photograph of Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee.



(L-R) Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli, Chairman, Centre for East Asian Studies, JNU, Shri Vijay Kranti, Senior Journalist & Tibetologist, Shri Janardhana Swamy, Member of Parliament & Member, Standing Committee on External Affairs and Shri Claude Arpi, Senior Columnist & China Expert.




Dr. Anirban Ganguly, director SPMRF addressing the gathering.



A view of the audience.

"We do not wish it to be known that we are simply the torch-bearers of somebody else, because we have also our own philosophy and our ideology. The doctrine for which India has stood has been the doctrine of live and let live...there are certain fundamental and basic ideologies for which India has stood and even stands today. We stand for freedom of expression, for freedom of thought, for freedom of association and religion and our Constitution has been based on the sound principles of democracy...Today two things are vitally necessary. We have to strengthen our military position and if we cannot do it alone we shall have to do it in collaboration with others with whom we can stand on a common platform in defence of a common ideology. Then we shall have to strengthen internal strength and peace, and satisfactorily solve the economic problem...so that we can create that solidarity and stability which would be impregnable both from the national and international standpoints."



- Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee

(Discussion in Parliament on the International Situation, 6th December, 1950)